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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to set out a bookkeeping procedure by
which a scientist (usi..g the term flexibly) may compare the conclusions
of a theory with facts obtained by reduction of observational data with
the aim of assessing the hypothesis on which the theory is based. It is
argued that the appropriate formalism is probability theory, and that the
key process is the inductive process as represented by Bayes' theorem
which indicates how the degree of belief in a hypothesis should be ad-
justed in response to new information.
The following model of the inductive process in science is adopted.
Between observation and theory there is an "interface" which comprises
a set of independent items: each item comprises a complete set of mu-
tually exclusive statements. It must be possible to assign two prob-
abilities to each of these statements, one by "reduction" of observational
data, and the other by theoretical analysis of the considered hypothesis.
The "observational" probabilities must be free from theoretical bias and
vice versa. Formulas are derived which show (a) how the assumed proba-
bility of the hypothesis should be adjusted in response to information
concerning one item, and (b) how such estimates concerning more than one
item may be combined.
The model further requires that one should consider not one hypothe-
sis but a complete set of mutually exclusive hypotheses. It is necessary
to reconcile this requirement with the normal situation that a scientist
has one or two specific theories to evaluate, the hypotheses of which
do not form a complete set. A procedure is proposed to overcome this
difficulty. One may compare a real analysis (or analyses) of a specified
hypothesis (or hypotheses) with a "null" analysis of the complement of
this hypothesis (or hypotheses). A "null" analysis is that which admits
complete ignorance about the conclusions to be drawn from a hypothesis:
the relevant probabilities may therefore be determined without specific
knowledge of the hypothesis. If a specified theory fares worse than a
"null" theory, it is a bad theory.
The method is illustrated by a "worksheet" indicating the way in
which a few observational facts about pulsars may be used to appraise
both the neutron-star hypothesis and the white-dwarf hypothesis.
ii
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I.	 INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with the role of induction in scientific
research. However the principal aim is not to undertake a philosophical
inquiry per se, but rather to set up a bookkeeping procedure for organiz-
ing the judgments involved in comparing a scientific theory with scien-
tific data. For my own convenience, I shall draw examples from astro-
physics, but I hope and believe that the ideas and methods could be use-
ful in other fields also.
A monograph on quasars  by Kahn and Palmor gives an example of the
type of judgment which scientists must attempt to make. What is unusual
about the example is that the authors have the candor to present their
judgment in numerical form. Table 3, on page 111 of that monograph, gives
the "estimated probability of correctness" of six hypotheses concerning
quasars. A similar appraisal was made by Professor L. Woltjer at the
Conference on Seyfert Galaxies held at Tucson, Arizona in February 1968.
Although judgments of the type quoted above provide an effective
means of communicating degrees of belief, they immediately raise a signi-
ficant question: "How were these estimates arrived at?" In the examples
quoted, there is no hint of the answer to this question. 2 An estimate
of this type, without a description of the process by which it was made,
invites controversy. The principal aim of this article is to present a
procedure for arriving at estimates of this type. This does not guarantee
that there will be no controversy, but it should help to localize the
area of disagreement and so make the controversy more profitable.
The examples quoted have already established one relevant point:
The appropriate formalism to use in investigating this problem is prob-
ability theory. Our aim then is to set up a model for the reasoning
process involved in evaluating a scientific theory, and to analyze this
model by the theory of probability. As I. J. Good  has remarked, "Prob-
ability is a part of reasoning and is therefore more fundamental than
most theories." It is in this sense that the present article may be re-
garded as a "theory of theories."
Before proceeding, it is important to state that we shall not be
concerned with a possible comparison between "perfect data' s (observational
or experimental) and a "perfect theory." Even if we knew what these 	 j
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terms meant, their discussion would be irrelevant to everday life.
Our aim is to determine how one can make a judgment about a theory which
is admittedly uncertain and incomplete, in comparing it with data which
are uncertain and incomplete. We further recognize that such an evalua-
tion must be made not once, but progressively, as the data come in and
as the theory develops. The following remarks of Jeffreys4 are relevant
here: "Either we can learn from experience or we cannot. The ability
to learn from experience demands the concept of probability in relation
r
to varying data, and the recognition of the meanings of more probable
than and less probable than."
2.	 INDUCTION AND BAYES' THEOREM
Although textbooks frequently represent a science, such as physics,
as being deductive, scientists are well aware that this is a charart3ris-
tic of textbooks,not of science. P. G. Bergman, speaking at the Fourth
Texas Conference on Relativistic Astrophysics in Dallas in 1968, stated
"'Let the facts lead you where they may' is a gross oversimplification of
how to proceed in science and not necessarily philosophically justified."
The difference between deduction and induction has been pointed out very
clearly by Polya5 by means of the following examples.
The basic reasoning process of the deductive type is the syllogism:
A implies B.
B is false.
Therefore A is false.
By contrast, the inductive process follows a pattern such as the
following:
A implies B.
B is true.
Therefore A is more credible.
The above example, although descriptive, does not lend itself to
numerical evaluation. The basic procedure for making quantitative esti-
mates of inductive arguments is proviled by Bayes' theorem. According
to Jeffreys, 6 "This theorem is to the theory of probability what
Pythagoras's theorem is to geometry."
2
We introduce the notation (AIB) to denote the probability that
proposition A is true on the basis of the knowledge that proposition B
is true. We adopt the convention that the measure of probability extends
over the range 0 to 1: (AIB) = 0 if A is impossible given B; and
(AIB) = 1 if A is certain given B.
The notation AB stands for the "product" of the two propositions
A and B. Then AB is true if and only if both A and B are true.
"product rule" of probability theory ? then states that
(ABIC) = (AIBC)(BIC) .
However, since AB = BA, this may alternatively be written as
(ABIC) = (BIAC)(AIC) .
We now see from these two equations that
(Al BC) = (B I AC) (AIC)(B C)
This is Bayes' theorem.
In order to show the relationship of this theorem to the scientific
method, we consider the following "model" of the scientific process. A
certain hypothesis H is to be evaluated by comparing the theoretical con-
sequences of this hypothesis with observation (either of the world as we
find it or of a contrived situation called an "experiment"). Note here
an important point: It must be possible to formulate a statement which
makes sense either when it is regarded as the consequence of a theoretical
analysis, or when it is regarded as the result of an observation. Since
this statement forms a crucial "link" between theory and observation, we
use for it the symbol L. We also introduce the symbol X to denote all
information available to the scientist in addition to (and, we assume,
preceding) his knowledge, derived from observation, that L is true. Theq^
Bayes' theorem may be rewritten as
(HI LX)	 (LI HX) ( HI X) •	 12.4)
The term (HIX) is the "prior probability" of the hypothesis H (prior,
that is, to knowledge of L). The term (HILX) is the "post probability"
of H, based on knowledge of both X and L. Bayes' theorem then tells us
that the post probability equals the prior probability multiplied by a
certain factor (LIHX)/(LIX) which is sometimes termed the "likelihood."
This is the ratio of the probability that L is true, given H and infor-
mation X, to the probability that L is true, given only the information
X.
Equation (2.4) gives us a procedure for adjusting our degree of be-
lief in a hypothesis on the basis of incoming observational evidence.
If H is irrelevant to L, then (LIHX) = (LIX) so that (HILX) = (HIX):
the probability is, appropriately enough, not affected by knowledge that
L is true. If L seems quite likely on the basis of knowledge X, but very
unlikely on the basis of X and the hypothesis H, then the probability
that H is true is greatly reduced by the knowledge that L is true. If,
on the other hand, L seems quite unlikely on the basis of information X
alone, but quite likely on the basis of information X and the hypothesis
H, then the fact that L is known (observationally) to be true greatly
increases the probability that H is true.
It is worth noting a few further aspects of this theorem.
1. If (LIX) = 0, there is something wrong with our information
X, since L is incompatible with X, yet L is observed to be true.
2. Assuming that (LIX) 0 0, (HILX) = 0 if (HIX) = 0. That is,
an impossible hypothesis remains impossible, no matter what
the evidence.
3. Denoting by H the negative of H, so that "H is true" means
( '51M)"H is not true", we see from (2) that H^  = 0 if ( HIX) =0.
This may be stated alternatively as (HILX) = 1 if (HIX) = 1,
since by the sum rule of probability theory,
(HIX) + (HIX) = 1, etc.	 (2.5)
4
In other words, if H is certain befora we have knowledge of L,
it will be certain after we have knowledge of L, no matter what
L may be.
We see from the above paragraph that one should be very careful about
assigning probability zero or unity to any proposition, since this entail
that we can never change these estimates, no matter what subsequent in-
fromation may turn up. I. J. Good has some useful advice on this point:S
"Probability ,judgments can be sharpened by laying bets at suitable odds.
If people always felt obliged to back their opinions when challenged, we
would be spared a few of the 'certain' predictions that are ro freely
made." Whether or not we make wagers, we should, for the sake of future
credibility, be very cautious about making "certain" theoretical predic-
tions or stating "certain" observational facts: Theorists sometimes find
a calculation to be wrong, and observers sometimes find that their re-
sults are not supported by subsequent observations by other groups.
3. MODEL OF THE INDUCTIVE PROCESS IN SCIENCE
Equation (2.4) of the preceding section, and the discussion which
followed it, give a rough approximation to tho inductive process in
science. The simple model given in Section 2 would be adequate in a sim-
ple situation in which theory could predict the reading which one should
obtain from a particular measuring device such as a meter. This however
is not the usual situation in science. It may take a great deal of jug-
gling and maneuvering to find a quantity which can be both measured and
calculated.
Indeed, although one thinks of measurement as being the key process
in exact sciences, many of the comparisons made between theory and obser-
vation are not normally expressed in terms of measurable quantities. For
instance, one may require of a physical theory that it should be covariant
under some transformation (Galilean, Lorentz, etc.). In the early studies
of quasars, one of the most important questions was to determine whether
the objects are "intragalactic" or "extragalactic." Similarly, the nature
of pulsars for sometime hinged upon the question "Is a pulsar a white
dwarf or a neutron star?"
i
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Our first aim in this section is to set up a "model" for the induc-
tive process in sc4.ence which is a closer approximation to the methods
actually used than the simple model presented in Section 2. The essential
requirement is to be able to make a comparison between theory and obser-
vation. Hence a key requirement is for an "interface" between theory
and observation. It seems that the basic requirement for such an inter-
face is that there should be a language which can be understood both by
theorists and by observers. More specifically, we adopt the following
definition of the interface for the purpose of constructing a model: The
interface comprises a number of statements, each of which is both (a)
a possible result of data reduction of observations, and (b) a possible
consequence of theoretical analysis of a hypothesis under consideration.
It is convenient to make further assumptions about these statements.
We assume that they may be arranged into groups: Each group of statements
will be termed an "item." We assume that there is a finite set of items
Ia ,	 a = 1, 2, . . . ,	 A.
With each item Ia there is to be associated a group of statements
which, for present convenience, we assume to be finite in number. (This
assumption can be relaxed without difficulty and must be relaxed when
dealing with statements about continuous variables.) This set of state-
ments will be represented by San , n = 1,2, . . ., Na. For convenience,
we assume that the group of statements associated with any item are mutu-
ally exclusive and complete. That is, for any item such as I a, one
and only one of the statements S^;M is true.
When a science is well established, one tends to forget that tue
theory of that science is simply a construct, the validity of which is
to be established by comparison with observations. Indeed, one can easily
come to regard the abstract construct as having a "reality" of its owr:.
A remark by Eddington 9
 is particularly appropriate here: `'Plysfcal science
may be defined as 'the systematization of knowledge ohtainc a by measure-
ment.' It is a convention that this knowledge shall be formt,lated as a
description of a world--called the ' physical univorse'." It is necessary
for us to distinguish between observational data and theoretical data,
and to consider explicitly tho connection between :horn.
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We first consider what goes on on the observational side of the in-
terface. An astronomer obtains his information by means of photographs,
spectra, radio records, etc., whichever happens to be the output of the
observational instrument he is using. An experimenter collects similar
"raw data.' However, neither observer nor experimenter transmits this
raw data to his scientific colleagues. The transaction between the ob-
server (this term being used to include "experimenter") and the theorist
I	 is typically the publication of an article in which the observational re-
sults are presented and analyzed. Sometimes the conclusions which the
observer draws from his data have almost the certaint y of mathematical
deduction. Usually, however, there are a number of assumptions and pro-
visos which are explicitly or implicitly involved in going from the data
to the conclusions. Furthermore, this process of "data reduction" prob-
ably involves the use of theoretical knowledge. One must pay careful
attention to this aspect of data reduction, if one's aim is to compare
the results of the observation with one or more theories.
The basic rule of data reduction is that, if theoretical knowledge
is to be used, it should be carefully specified, and preferably should
comprise only theoretical knowledge which is beyond dispute. If the aim
of an observation is to obtain information with which to evaluate one or
more theoretical hypothesis, the data reduction must studiously avoid any
steps which explicitly or implicitly appeal to these hypotheses.
Data reduction can range from a very simple to a very sophisticated
operation. A new technique in data reduction may .represent an important
step forward in a science. The construction of the Hertzsprung-Russell
11diagram 10,	 is a case in point. In looking at raw data, one may not be
able to see the wood for the trees. The aim of good data reduction is to
enable one to see the shape of the forest. A Hertzsprung-Russell diagram
might be prepared from many precise observations, yet the significant
information in the diagram may comprise the approximate clustering of
points to form a simple and not-to-well-defined curve.
In the present model, the result of data analysis is to provide
varying degrees of support for alternative statements S 	 of each item
am
Ia , on the basis of observational knowledge which we denote by 0. In
this model, the sum total of observational knowledge, as it may be used
7
for comparison with theory, is provided by the set of probabilities
(S ,n +ROX). R denotes the process of data reduction. This symbol should
be introduced since different reduction procedures may lead to different
estimates of the reduced data.
Since, for each Q- , the set of statements SCM are complete and
mutually exclusive, we see from the sum rule of probability theory that
Na	 Na
(S
cen
IX)
 = 1,	 (SanIROX) = 1, etc.	 (3.1)
n=1	 n=1
In the present context, X denotes all information which is not in ques-
tion, including theoretical knowledge used in the data reduction and,
conversely, whatever observational knowledge the theorist is to be per-
mitted to use in his analyses.
We now look at the other side of the fence, and inquire about opera-
tions on the theoretical side of the interface. The basic procedure has
been described by Jeffreys 12 , in his discussion of "theory": "The use of
the word 'theory' in several different senses is perhaps responsible for
a good deal of confusion. What I prefer to call an 'explanation' consists
of several parts: First, a statement of a hypothesis; secondly, tl,e sys-
tematic development of its consequences; thirdly, the comparison of these
consequences with observation."
However, Jeffreys elsewhere 13 makes the following relevant and quali-
fying remarks: "We get no evidence for a hypothesis by merely working
out its consequences and showing that they agree with some observations,
because it may happen that a wide range of other hypotheses would agree
with those observations equally well. To get evidence for it we must
also examine its various contradictories and show that they do not fit
the observations. This elementary principle is often overlooked in al..
leged scientific work, which proceeds by stating a hypothesis, quoting
masses of results of observation that might be expected on the hypothesis
and possibly on several contradictory ones, ignoring all that would not
be expected on it, but might be expected on some alternative, and claiming
that the observations support the hypothesis.
	
So long as
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alternatives are not examined and compared with the whole of the relevant
data, a hynothesis can never be more than a considered one."
We see from the above that the principal job of a theorist is to
determine by theoretical analysis the consequences of one or more hypo-
theses. As Jeffreys points out, one obtains the strongest evidence for
a hypothesis when one analyzes, and compares with observations, this
hypothesis and also whatever additional hypotheses are necessary to form
a complete set. An important case for us to consider is, therefore,
that we are considering a set of hypotheses Hi , i = 1, . . ., I, which
are mutually exclusive and form a complete set. We assume that each of
these hypotheses is subjected in turn to an analysis A so that one
arrives at probabilities for the statements S te , where these statements
are now regarded as consequences of each hypothesis considered in turn.
In this way we would arrive at the probabilities (S
CM
IAHiX). It may
well be that, if the problem is sufficiently well defined, each hypothesis
Hi implies a definite statement S 	 of each item Ia, so that each ofC4n
the probabilities (S
CM
IAH 1.X) would be either unity or zero. However,
there may be some uncertainty in the basic information X, and it is
normally the case that scientific analysis is incomplete and imperfect.
Hence we should expect that, in general, the probabilities (SCMIAHiX)
will have values between zero and unity.
Although it is most desirable to consider any hypothesis under con-
sideration as a member of a complete sct, and to analyze all members of
that set, this will often be impractical in normal scientific theoretical
work. It may be that the hypotheses can be identified, but are too many
in number for each of them to be analyzed. Another possibility is that
it is very difficult, or practically impossible, to identify hypotheses
which build up a given hypothesis into a complete set. It is therefore
important for us to have some way of proceeding which does not hinge upon
the explicit identification and analysis of a complete set of hypotheses.
Jeffreys recognizes that a well established hypothesis will. be ac-
cepted simply on the basis of the agreement between consequences of that
hypothesis and observation. He states 14 "The chief advances in modern
physics . . . were achieved by the method of Euclid and Newton: to state
a set of hypotheses, work out their consequences, and assert them if they
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accounted for most of the outstanding variation." It is therefore neces-
sary for us to specify a procedure which involves the detailed specifica-
tion and analysis of one or more hypotheses H1 ,. . ., HI , in the case
that this set of hypotheses does not form a complete set. We assume,
however, that the hypotheses are chosen to be mutually exclusive.
We assume that it is possible to expand this set of hypotheses to
form a complete set by adding a hypothesis H 0 which excludes and is
excluded by any one of the hypothesis H i , i = 1, . . ., I. (If the
set were to be specified explicitly, it might be more convenient to ex-
press H0
 as the disjunction of a large number of hypotheses, but for
present purposes this consideration is irrelevant.) Thus the set of
hypotheses Ho , Hi ,	 HI are mutually exclusive and form a complete
set.
We now ask what information we can obtain about the hypothesis H0
without specifying the hypothesis or carrying out an analysis of the
hypothesis. The answer is, of course, that in this circumstance we must
remain ignorant about H0 . However, this does not mean that we cannot
fit H0
 into our model of the inductive process in science. We have
recognized that theoretical analysis is in practice imperfect. We can
introduce, as an extreme case, a "null" analysis A0 which gives no
information whatever about the consequences of the hypothesis to which
it is applied. It is then possible to maintain the formalism which is
based on the assumption that we are analyzing the consequences of a com-
plete set of hypotheses, by adopting the following strategem: first, we
assume that the known hypotheses H 1 ,...,H1 , are supplemented by a hypo-
thesis H0 to form a complete set; second, we assume that, whereas each
hypothesis Hip ... ,H I is subjected to a proper analysis A, the hy-
pothesis H0 (which is not to be specified explicitly) is assumed to
be subjected to the "null" analysis A0 . We shall,for simplicity of
notation, suppress the symbols A and A 0 in the remainder of this
section.
Now suppose that we chose to identify (SCM, H0X) with (Sam X).
Since the hypotheses Ho , H1 ,..., H I form a complete set, we know that
H0 + H1 + ... + HI is true, where the summation sign here indicates a
"logical sum," i.e., ' s and/or." Hence
10
ISan	 Hilx = (sanlx)	 ( 3.2)u
i=0
On noting that the hypotheses HO , H1 ,...,H I are mutually exclusive, we
see from the sum rule of probability theory? that
I	 I
San
 ^_
Hi IX = ^ ( S=H i IX)	 (3.3)
i=0	 i=0
We may now use the produce rule ? to write
(IS CMHiIX) = ( S anI HiX) (Hi IX) ,	 (3.4)
so that
I
(Sam IX)
 =	 (S am IHiX)(Hi IX)	 (3.5)
i =0
If we now make the choice
(SanI H0X ) = ( SanIX)	 (3.6)
we see that
I
(SCM I H0X ) = L1 - (HOI X ) 7 -1 	 (S am I HiX )(Hi IX)	 (3.7)
i=1
It follows from this equation that if a particular statement S a , n , is
impossible on the basis of hypotheses H 1 ,..., HI , then it must be con-
sidered to be impossible on the basis of hypothesis HO also. This re-
presents a defect of the convention for (S
CLM
IHOX) specified by Equation
(3.6). We would like the probabilities ( S
am
IH0X) to be "maximally
noncommittal" about the statements S an , subject only to restrictions
11	 _
imposed by the information X. The manner in which one may ascribe
"maximally noncommittal" values to a set of statements, taking account
of possible information about the statements, has been discussed by
Jaynes. 
15 
We will not pursue this point here. For our purpose, it is
important only to note that it is necessary to specify the probabilities
(S C^ IH0X) in as noncommittal a manner as possible, and that it is not
desirable to adopt the convention (3.6).
Although we have recognized two very different theoretical situations,
it has now been possible to set up a .formalism which covers both cases.
The formulas which we shall derive in the next two sections may be applied
to either case. The difference between the two cases will become signi-
ficant only when we consider the information which is to be fed into the
formulas, or the interpretation to be placed upon estimates made by means
of the formulas. We shall discuss this further in the final section.
4.	 INDUCTION USING ONE FACT
We now suppose that, by data reduction, the observer has assigned
various probabilities to the statements which constitute the interface.
The theorist has assigned probabilities to the same statements based on
analysis of each considered hypothesis, and also possibly based on a null
analysis of a supplemental hypothesis. This information, and knowledge
of the prior probability of each hypothesis, should enable us to assign
a post probability to each hypothesis. That is, given the information
specified in the preceding section, and given the values of (Hi IX), we
should be able to calculate (H i IOX). Here and in subsequent sections
it is convenient to suppress the symbols R, A and A 0 . These are im-
plicitly present: the observations have been reduced by a specified
procedure; hypotheses H1 , ..., H I have been reduced by analysis A and
hypothesis HO (if it must be introduced) has been reduced by the null
analysis A0 . In line with this change of notation, we shall refer to
HO as the "ignorance hypothesis."
In this section, we make the simplifying assumption that there is
only one item to be considered. If we regard the observational knowledge
pertaining to an item as a "fact, " this means that we have only one fact
to consider. In this section, therefore, we may drop the suffix a.
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As an aside, we may note that this can be regarded as a formal change
rather than a substantive change, since it is always possible to combine
items. Specifically, we could introduce the notation
Snn'n"...
	
Sln S 2 S3n" ...
	
(4.1)
The set of statements Snn'n" again are mutually exclusive and form a
complete set, and they comprise all the information represented by the
separate groups of statements. However, our intention is to consider
one item in this section, and to consider in the next section how one
should combine information derived from
Our aim is to calculate (HiIOX),
various hypotheses as determined by the
observations 0. Since the statements
form a complete set, this probability m;
several separate items.
the "post probabilities" of the
prior information X and the
S
n 
are mutually exclusive and
xy be written as
(Hi Iox) = (Hi I Sn 1OX	 ,	 (4.2)
n	 ) 
where the summation sign indicates a "logical summation." By the sum
rule of probability theory, 7 this equation may be expressed as
(Hi Iox) _	 (HiSnIox)
	 ,	 (4.3)
n
and use of the product rule ? enables us to put this equation in the fol-
lowing form:
	
(HiIOX) _ i (Hi ISn0%)(Sn lox)	 (4.4)
n
According to the rules of our model, the connection between the hy-
potheses and the observations occurs only via the statements S n . If it
13
is asserted that S 	 is true, all other knowledge about the observations
is irrelevant, as far as the hypotheses are concerned. This property of
our model therefore implies that
(Hi IS nOX) = ( Hi IS nX)	 (4.5)
in consequence of which Equation (4.4) becomes
(Hi lox) = I ( Hi IS nX)(Sn IOX) 	(4.6)
n
At this stage we use the following form of Bayes' theorem [Equation
(2.3)J;
(S I H. X)
(Hi ISnX) _ (S X) (H lx)(4.7)
n
This introduces the probabilities (S
n 
IX), which do not appear among our
initial data. It is at this point that we profit from the assumption
that the set of hypotheses H,i are mutually exclusive and form a complete
set. We saw in Section 3 that these assumptions lead to Equation (3.5),
which is now written as
(Sn lx) _ ) (S n IHi X)(Hi
l x )
	 ,	 (4.8)
J
leaving the range of summation (0, 1, ..., N or 1, 2, ..., N), unspeci' ied .
Then Equation (4.7) becomes
(Snl HiX)(Hi ISnX) _	 (Sn HjX)(H . X) 
(Hi IX)	 (4.9)
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On combining Equations (4.4) and (4.9), we finally arrive at
(S IH,X)(S IOX)
(Hi IOX) _
	
c- (Sn HJX)(Hj X) (Hi IX)	 (4.10)
n Z
J
This equation is the principal result of this section. The above formula
for the post probabilities (H. ! OX) involves only the prior probabilities
(Hi IX) and the probabilities of statements S  as determined on the one
hand by reduction of the observations 0 and on the other hand by analysis
of the hypotheses H,. We may note the following desirable property of
i
this equation
(HiIOX) = 1	 (4.11)
i
This shows that the formula (4.10) will never yield a probability of a
hypothesis greater than unity, and that it will show the probability of
one hypothesis to be equal to unity only if it shows the probabilities
of all other hypotheses to be zero.
5.	 INDUCTION USING MANY FACTS
In the preceding section we obtained a formula to describe the prob-
abilities to be assigned to a set of hypotheses on the basis of the prior
probabilities and of observational and theoretical knowledge concerning
one item of the interface. We now consider how we may take account of
knowledge concerning several such items. We assume that these items
are "independent" in a sense to be specified later.
It is convenient to introduce F as the "fact" associated with
the item Ia. According to our model, the fact Fa comprises the set
of probabilities (San lox), n = 1,..., Na.
We now suppose that a group of hypotheses Hi have been evaluated
in terms of two facts F1 and F2 , considered separately and indepen-
dently. In this way we have arrived at probabilities which may be written
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as (Hi IF 1X), ( H i IF1 X). The problem which we now consider is that of
determining the probabilities (Hi IF1 F2 X). The sense in which F 1 and
F2 are considered to be independent is the following: knowledge of F1
will influence our interpretation of F2
 only through the effect which
F 1 has on our evaluation of the hypotheses Hi 	 and the influence of
knowledge of hypotheses H. on our interpretation of F,,. We assume of
course that the converse also is true.
We first note that ( Hi IF1 F2X) may be expressed as follows:
(HiF1IF2X)
(Fi i I F1 F2X) _ (F1 F2X) (5.1)
By an argument parallel to that leading to Equation. (4.4), we see that
(111 F1 IF2X) _	 (HiF1IHjF2X)(HiIF2X)
	
(5.2)
J
and
(F1IF2X) _	 (F1IHjF2X)(HiIF2X)	 (5.3)
.7
We now note that the first term on the right-hand side of (5.2) may be
expressed as
(HiF1IHjF2X) = (Hi IF1 Hj F2X)(F1 IHj F2X)	 (5.4)
However, since the set of hypotheses is assumed to be mutually excluEive
and complete,
(HiIF1HjF2X) = 5 i	 (5.5)
Furthermore, our specification of the sense in which F1 and F2 are
taken to be independent implies that
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	(FI IHj F2X) = (F 1 IH
i
X)	 (5.6)
If we now note from Bayes' theorem that
(H I F X)
(F2 IH1X) _ (H X) (F2 IX)
	
(5. 7)
we find from Equations (5.2) through (5.7) that Equation (5.1) may be
expressed as
(HiIF1X)(HiIF2X)((HiIX)]-1
(H i IF1 F2X) _	 -1	 (5.8)
(H^IF1X)(H^IF2X)U H^IX)l
i
It is a straightforward matter to prove (by induction!) that the general
formula is
(HiIF1X) ... (HiIF AX) [(HiIX)]-(A-1)
(HiIF1...FAX) _
	
-(A-1)
	
(5.9)
(Hi IF1 X) ... (Hi I FAX) I (H
i 
IX) 7
We note from this equation that
	
(H IF ...F X) = 1	 (5.16)
i 1	 A
6. WORK-SHEET CONCERNING THE THEORY OF" PULSARS
Since the principal aim of this article is a bookkeeping procedure
rather than a philosophical inquiry, it seems expedient to present a
simple example of the use of the formulas which we have derived, before
indulging in a philosophical discussion of the their significance.
The example to be discussed concerns the current astrophysical prob-
lem of the nature of pulsars. 16 Although it is now generally agreed that
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a pulsar is to be identified with a rotating neutron star, less than a
year ago there was a lively controversy concerning two possibilities:
the rotating neutron star model and the pulsating white dwarf model. In
January 1989 the evidence had become st,:ongly favorable to the neutron
star hypothesis, and I was interesteil to try to aseoss the strength .,f
the case by using the techniques presented in this article. Aie following
'	 material is therefore to be regarded as ,. pe.sonal worksheet (which is
now several months out of date), not a valid description of the present
state of knowledge concerning pulsars.
The "work-sheet" is presented in Table 1. Four items are here con-
sidered.
1. The range of period.
2. The change of period.
3. Connection with supernovae.
4. Absence of photospheric radiation.
These items will be discussed in turn. In addition to the hypotheses
that the object is a neutron star (H1 ) and that the object is a white-
dwarf (H2 ), we consider the "ignorance" hypothesis (H D ), allowing
for the possibility that there may be some other hitherto unsuspected
explanation.
Before discussing the above items, we should recognize that one item
is conspicuous by its absence: namely, radio emission. The reason this
was not considered is that very little persuasive information was avail-
able concerning radio emission from a neutron-star model or from a white-
dwarf model. Hence, in this reapect, each model would fare no better
and no worse than the ignorance hypothesis. Such an item need not be
considered explicitly - it is "ignorable." Similarly, if there is no ob-
servational information about an item, it is ignorable.
There is another interesting aspect to the (absent) item concerned
with radio emission. It is concerned not with a possible property of
pulsars, but with a necessary property. In order for an object to be
accepted as a pulsar, it must have certain properties. In the early
days of a phenomenon, such properties will typically be observational.
In order to clarify this point, we introduce for this purpose only a
"zeroth" item:	 t
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Table 1. PULSAR WORK-SHEET
Based on prior probabilities (HO IX) = (H1 IX.) = (H2 IX) = 1/3
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Item 1.	 Range of Period
SPeriods extend over range - . 03 sec
11
1 .5 1 .01
to	 3 sec
0 .5 0 .99
S12 :	S11 not true
Post probabilities .331 .662 .007
Item 2: Change of Period
S21 : All pulsars slow down .97 . 33 1 .09
S22 : Neither S21 nor S23 true .03 . 33 0 .01
S23 : All pulsars speed up 0 .34 0 .9
Post probabilities . 256 .681 .063
Item 3.	 Association with Supernovae
S31 : All	 pulsars related to supernovae . 9 .03 .99 0
S32:
Some pulsars related to supernovae .1 .01 .01 .01
S33 : No pulsars related to supernovae 0 .96 0 .99
Post probabilities . 060 .'07 .033
Item 4. Photospheric Radiation
S41'
No pulsars have detectable photo-	 . 99 .33 1	 .01
spheric radiation
S42 : Some pulsars have detectable photo-	 . 01 .33 0	 .09
spheric radiation
S43 : All pulsars have detectable photo-	 0 .34 0	 .9
spheric radiation
Post probabilities .257 .257	 .010
Post probabilities based on all facts . 012 .988	 1.37 X10 8
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I*em 0. Periodic Pulsed Radio Emission.
The statements might be chosen as follows:
S1: The ohJect emits detectable periodic pulsed radio emis-
sion.
S2: The object does not emit detectable periodic pulsed radio
emission.
Then a pulsar is "defined" by the statement S 01 . Hence it becomes a
convention, associated with the name "pulsar," that ( SOl IOX) = 1. Note
that the strict separation between observational facts and theoretical
conclusions applies here also: the convention that ( S01 IOX) = 1 should
not prejudice the evaluation of (S Oil RX) for any hypothesis.
We may also note that the definition of a
be observational in nature and at another time
It may be, for instance, that when pulsars are
will be defined by a hypothetical mode117,
We now return to a discussion of Items 1
phenomenon may at one time
theoretical in nature.
"fully" understood, they
4.
Item 1. The Range of Periods.
We adopt the following statements for this item.
S11	 The periods cf pulsars extend over a range extending from
.03 sec or below to 3 sec or above.
S12 : The ra.;ge of periods does not extend as low as .03 zec
and/or does not extend as high as 3 sec.
We know from observational evidence that statement S 11 is correct.
Hence we set ( S 11 IOX) = 1 and (S 12 IOX) = 0,
Here. and in Items 2 and 4, we assign equal probabilities to possible
statements of an item, when regarded as consequences of the ignorance
theory. Hence we assign (S 11 IH0X) = .5,	 (S12 IHOX) = .5.
The neutron star hypothesis is compatible with any periods down to
a minimum value of about 1 m sec. Hence we set (S ii !H1X) = 1,
(S12IH1X) = 0.
If the pulses were produced by pulsation of a white dwarf, one would
expect the periods to extend over a range from about one second to several
seconds. However, one cannot be completely confident that shorter periods
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are quite impossible. Therefore, to be conservative, we say (SII IH2X) _ .01,
(S12IH2X) = .99.
We may now use Equation (4.10) to evaluate the post-probabilities
of the three alternative hypotheses, using the information of Item 1.
On denoting by F1
 the observational data relevant to Item 1, we find
that 010 IF1X) = .331, (H 1 IF1X) = .662 and (H2 IF1X) = .007.
Item 2. Rate of Change of Period.
The statements are as shown in the table. Five pulsars are known
to be slowing down. No observable change has been detected for other
pulsars, which we interpret to mean that the rate of change is too small
for its sign to be determined. If we assign equal prior probabilities
to the three possible statements, the fact that five pulsars are known
to be slowing down leads to the observational probabilities shown in the
tablE;.
If pulsars are rotating neutron stars, we expect pulsars to slow
down.
If pulsars are pulsating white dwarfs, we expect them to speed up,
since the white dwarf should become smaller and denser as it ages. How-
ever, without specifying what kind of pulsation we are considering, we
should assign a small probability to the possiblity that the pulsations
will speed up. To be cautious, we should also make some allowance for
the possibility that some pulsars slow down and some pulsars speed up.
These considerations lead to the probabilities shown.
The post-probabilities based on data for this item are also shown.
Item 3. Relationship of Pulsars to Supernovae.
It is known that two pulsars are located in the same positions as
supernova remnants. This suggests that all pulsars are related to super-
novae (Statement S31 ). However, one should allow for the possibility
that only some pulsars are related to supernovae (Statement S 32 ). We
can rule out the possibility that no pulsars are related to supernovae
(Statement S33).
The only idea which has been advanced concerning the creation of
a neutron star is that it is formed during r. supernova explosion. The
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neutron-star hypothesis therefore leads us to expect that all pulsars
should be related to supernovae. However, to be cautious, we might allow
for the possibility that there is some other way in which neutron stars
can be formed, and therefore assign a small probability, on the basis of
H 1 , to S32.
The current view about white dwarfs is that they represent a state
of senility reached by low-mass stars in a non-catastrophic evolution.
However, the idea has been suggested that a supernova explosion may leave
a white dwarf as end product. We therefore choose the probabilities shown.
In assigning probabilities to the statements of Item 3 for the igno-
rance hypothesis, the simplest procedure of assigning equal weight to the
alternatives seems unacceptable, since a supernova remnant is an unusual
object. The key question is: "What is the probability that objects
which are (or appear to be) supernova remnants are associated with some
unspecified object which is neither a neutron star nor a white dwarf?"
Most astronomers would regard the probability as small, but we are alert
to the fact that we must not set the probability as zero. Taking this
question in isolation (i.e., neglecting all other evidence related to
pulsars), I should regard .1 as too high and .01 as too low; accordingly,
I choose (S3i IHOX) _ .03. I assign a somewhat lower probability to the
possibility that, if pulsars are neither neutron stars nor white dwarfs,
some of them happen to be related to supernova remnants or objects which
look like supernova remnants, setting (SS 32 1HOX) _ .01. Hence
(S33 IHOX) _ .96.
Item 4. Photospheric Radiation.
In only one case has a star-like optical object been identified with
a pulsar: this is the south-preceding star of the Crab Nebula, identified
with the Crab pulsar. However, it has been shown that the radiation of
this "star" ,consists of pulses similar to the radio pulses, so that it
cannot be interpreted as photospheric radiation. There is one normal
star near the location of the pulsar CP 1919, but this is generally
thought not to be the optical counterpart of the pulsar. To avoid being
dogmatic, we choose the probabilities listed in the table.
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A neutron star is too small for its photospheric radiation to be
optically detectable. On the other hand, a white dwarf should be clearly
visible at the typical distance estimated for a pulsar. However, the
luminosity of a white dwarf decreases steadily as it gets older, so that
it is possible that some white dwarfs of a sample would be invisible, and
we cannot rule out the possibility that all white dwarfs of a given class
may be invisible. These considerations are reflected in the probabilities
listed in item 4.
We see from the Table that each fact counts against the white-dwarf
hypothesis. However, none could be considered to be conclusive. In
Items 1, 2 and 3, the neutron star hypothesis fares better than the igno-
rance hypothesis, but not much better. This is due simply to the fact
that each item has been divided into only a small number of possible
statements. In order to get strong evidence for a hypothesis in compar-
ison with the ignorance hypothesis, it is necessary to consider an item
divided into a large number of statements, or to have some reason for assigning
very nonuniform weighting to the possible statements on the basis of the
ignorance hypothesis, as in the case of Item 3.
The post-probabilities calculated from each of the four facts may
be combined by means of Equation (5.9). When this is done, we arrive at
the result
(HOIOX) = .012
(H1 IOX) = . 988
(H2 IOX) = 1.37 X 10-6
We see that the combined facts give very strong evidence against the
white-dwarf hypothesis. If one were to consider the white dwarf hypo-
thesis and the neutron star hypothesis as being the only possibilities,
then the considerations listed above would show conclusively that pulsars
are to be interpreted as neutron stars. If, however, we give equal prior-
probability to the hypothesis that there is some other explanation, then
we find that the evidence for the neutron-star hypothesis is good, but
not overwhelming.
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When probabilities become very close to unity or very close to zero,
it is convenient to introduce a change of notation which gives a better
feeling for the magnitude of the effect. The change of notation fits
most easily with the "odds" notation where the odds on a proposition is
defined as P/(1-P), that is, the ratio of the probability that the pro-
position is true to the nrobabiiity that it is not true. The odds on a
proposition can clear' , vary from zero to infinity, so that it is con-
(	 venient to use logarithmic notation. Good 18 recommends that one use
the decibel notation. McCamy19 , in a recent article, recommends the use
of "brigg" (decibrigg, etc.) as a general term, in place of bel. How-
ever, the symbol "db" may be used for either "decibel" or "decibrigg,"
according to taste.
Using the symbol H to denote the proposition "H is not true," we
may now express the above result as follows.
(HO IOX) /(HO IOX) _ .012
( Hl IOX) /(H1 IOX) = 83
(H2 IOX) /(H2 IOX) = 1.37 X 10-6
These results may be expressed in db-notation as follows:
Odds on HO = -19.2 db,
Odds on Iil = 19.2 db,
Odds on H2 = -58.6 db.
We see that, if the only admitted possibilities were the neutron-star
hypothesis and the white-dwarf hypothesis, the odds on the neutron-star
hypothesis would be about 87 db. However, if one admits the ignorance
hypothesis, and gives it equal prior probability with the other two hy-
potheses, then the odds on the neutron-star hypothesis is only 15 db.
This demonstrates a view of scientific theories which sometimes finds
expression: it is easier to prove a theory wrong than to prove it right
20
The high value of the odds on H1 , when HO is ignored, is really due
to the high odds against H2.
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The above example shows that a combination of three or four quite
cautious statements can lead to a strong result. We note also teat, with
one exception, the statements do not involve numbers. Hence the applica-
tion of this type of formalism is not restricted to problems involving
numerical data. It could be applied equally well to biology, criminology
or social science.
We may also point out two defects of the above worksheet. A large
value (.9) was assigned to (S 31 1OX). This was due to the fact that
both the Crab pulsar and the vela pulsar are associated with supernova
remnants. However, this represents only two pulsars out of about twenty-
six. If all pulsars should be equally likely to show this association,
then the evidence is not too impressive. However, observable supernova
remnants are only a few hundred or a few thousands years old so that this
association should be observable only for young pulsars. If one adopts
the neutron-star hypothesis, then one would expect to observe an associa-
tion with supernova remnants only for short-period pulsars. This is
what is found to be the case. Hence, in assigning a large value to
(S31 10X), I was in fact making use of the hypothesis H 1 . This means
that I broke one of the basic rules of the game. The interface should
therefore be adjusted accordingly, for instance by taking S31 to be the
statement "short period pulsars are related to young supernova remnants."
At this date (June 1969), one would face a further difficulty in
drawing up the above worksheet. It has been observed 21 that the Vela
pulsar speeded up between 24 February and 3 March 1969, and then slowed
down again. Should one therefore assert that (S 21 1OX) = 0 and
(S22 1OX) = 1? Strictly speaking, one should. But this would be mis-
leading, in the sense that it would not represent the way science is done.
At this stage, the scientist would begin to modify what he regards
as the "pulsar problem. " He would say that the "basic" problem,repre-
senting the "normal behavior" of pulsars, is such that all pulsars slow
down. 22 He would regard the behavior of the Vela pulsar as an anomaly,
representing a minor secondary phenomenon, which he will probably not
bother about until he has arrived at an adequate understanding of the
"normal behavior." With this modification in the definition of the prob-
lem, one could still assert in June 1969 that (S 2110X)= .97, (S 2210X)
.03, (S23 1OX) = 0.
25
7.	 DISCUSSION
It is hoped that the theory which has been developed in the preced-
ing sections will be interesting for two reasons: first, because it
provides a way to combine observational and theoretical evidence to assess
how well a theory explains an observational phenomenon; and, second,
because one can learn some useful lessons from the exercise of trying to
establish a procedure for making this assessment.
We saw in the previous section how the formalism may ho used in prac-
tice. However, the formulas which we have derived and the example which
we gave are such that each item is divided up into a finite number of
alternative statements. In some cases, for instance when considering
continuous measurable quantities, it will be necessary to consider a
continuous sequence of statements. The required modification of Equation
(4.10) is straightforward.
We now suppose that the statements are enumerated by a continuous
variable v rather than the discrete variable n. For instance, the
statement S  may be the statement that the measurable quantity 	 has
the value F(v). If we now denote by "S v to Sv+dv
	
the logical sum
of all statements enumerated by v as it runs from v to v+dv, we
can introduce the notation
(Sv to Sv+dVJ HiX) = (Sv IHi X) v dv, etc.	 (7.1)
Using this notation, and replacing the summation sign in Equation (4.10)
by an integration sign, we obtain the formula
(SvIHiX) v (SvIOX)v
(Hi IOX) = fdv	
(Sv HJ X) v (HJ X) (H
i
 IX)
	
(7.2)
J
We now turn to some of the implications of the model. The first is
that it is essential to set up an appropriate and meaningful interface
between observational data and theoretical calculation. Netting to the
interface from observations needs data reduction. An excellent example
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of data reduction, in which an observer goes more than half way to meet
the theorist, is given in an article by Ellison. 23
We may note, as an aside, that reduction is only one link in the
chain, and the absence of agreement between observation and theory may
on occasion be traced to faulty reduction. This point also was made by
Sherlock Holmes: 24 " I ought to know by this time that when a fact appears
to be opposed to a long train of deductions, it invariably proves to be
capable of some other interpretation."
The question of bias is very interesting. It is generally recognized
that theorists' conclusions are likely to be biased by knowledge of the
observations. The reason that great weight is attached to predictions is
that these are manifestly free from such bias. It is equally important
that facts stated by an observer should be free from bias due to knowledge
of theory, but theorists are not so concerned about this possibility that
they demand observers to make observations before a theory has been pro-
posed.' Ther l is therefore a double standard applied to theorists and
observers. However, it would clearly not be possible to require both
prediction by the theorists and "pre-observsttion" by the observers.
It is useful to introduce the term "hard fact" for the case that
observations lead to a high probability for one statement of an item and
very small probabilities for all alternative statements. The other type
of fact may be called a "soft fact." Similarly, we may talk about a
"firm conclusion" and a "weak conclusion." We now note that, to get a
good test of a theory, we should be able to compare one or more hard
facts with one or more firm conclusions. In the case that: we are matching
a hard fact with a weak conclusion, or a soft fact with a firm conclusion,
we are no better off than if we were comparing a soft fact with a weak
conclusion. In this case we could say that the strength of the inference
is "theory limited" or "observation limited," respectively. The econom-
ical use of observational effort and theoretical effort requires a sort
of "impedance matching" at the interface:
Sometimes a theory will have one or more adjustable parameters.
This possibility may be included in the present formalism by supposing
that we are dealing with a continuous sequence of hypotheses II , , where
A is a continuous variable. With the notation
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	(H A
 to HA+dnI X) _ (H A ,X)^\ dA, etc.	 ,	 (7.3)
Equation (4.10) becomes
(SnI H EX) (S n I OX)
(H^ OX)T =	 )	 (Hl X)	 (7.4)
n
fd4(s 
n 
IH 
k 
X)(H IX)µ	 A	 A
and Equation (5.9) becomes
(HA I F1X)V. (HAIFAX) ((HA'X)X)-(A-1)
I
(H)
 Fl . ..FAX) T =	
dµ(HµIFIX)µ...(HµIFAX)4[(Hµ IX) 4)-(A-1).	
(7.5)
This method of determining optimum values of parameters of the theory
is very closely related to the "maximum likelihood" method of statistics. 25
The principal concern of this article has been the problem of estab-
lishing a theory as a correct interpretation of a physical phenomenon.
When alternative theories can be clearly enumerated, there is the possi-
bility of establishing one of them as correct by proving that the others
are incorrect. When alternative theories cannot be clearly enumerated
(and this is generally the case), the evidence may point strongly to one
of the specified theories, but one must always bear in mind the possibility
that further information will come along whit_, will disprove that theory.
In this sense, the general situation is that, at any time, there is no
"correct" theory of a phy.Lical phenomenon--there is only a "front runner.'
Although it is instructive, and may sometimes be helpful, to try to
specify rules for consistent thinking about scientific theories, any
scientist is aware that there are psychological factors as well as ra-
tional factors involved in securing acceptance of a theory. It is no
doubt the psychological factors which led to the following highly pes-
simistic observation, attributed to Max Plank: "A new scientific truth
does not triumph by convincing the opposition aad making them see the
light, but rather by the opponents dying off and a new generation growing
up to accept it as the truth."
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